

Global Strategy: Quadrant

Global Strategy: Quadrant | November 18, 2016

Reflation and Uncertainty

- "It's our dollar, but it's your problem," a former U.S. Treasury Secretary once explained. So it is again for global investors and policymakers. U.S. interest rate expectations are now on a higher and less predictable course given the prospect of a new round of U.S. fiscal easing.
- We see a high likelihood of U.S. corporate and personal income tax cuts implemented by mid-2017 by the new Trump administration. A deficit-financed infrastructure spending program is possible, but somewhat less probable given potential Congressional opposition.
- Trump's tax-and-spend campaign promises appear to represent a "high-risk, high-reward" gamble to accelerate U.S. growth. Given a revival in U.S. labor force growth, restrained import prices, and perhaps stronger productivity gains, Trump's fiscal plans have a chance of working as intended, at least for a time.
- Comparisons to Reagan have already been made. However, global asset prices are
 very different from what they were at the start of 1981. Inflation then was falling from
 a 14% rate and the U.S. dollar was at a generational low. By contrast, interest rates
 and inflation today are just beginning to rise from historical lows. The U.S. dollar
 already posted a large gain between 2011 and 2015. A further U.S. dollar surge from
 present levels is thus far from assured.
- "Announcement effects" from other large policy surprises suggest markets quickly
 price in a new outlook. Such effects may represent the larger part of any future asset
 market impact. Long-term U.S. interest rates have already jumped 45 basis points
 since November 8 and equity market sectors have seen a "violent" rotation.
- However, in light of the generally less predictable road ahead, as well as the
 probability of significant U.S. fiscal easing, the Citi Private Bank Global Investment
 Committee made several asset allocation changes to reduce overall portfolio risk
 again. These included a cut in global equities to -1.0% from neutral and steps to
 reduce duration in bond portfolios.
- We believe the U.K. referendum and U.S. presidential election highlight pending
 political risks in Europe, where inter-country cooperation is of greater financial
 consequence than elsewhere. The European political calendar over the coming
 twelve months will likely involve many rounds of apprehension and suspense.

Steven Wieting
Global Chief Investment Strategist
+1-212-559-0499
Steven.Wieting@citi.com




GIC November 17th – Summary

The Citi Private Bank Global Investment Committee reduced its allocation to global equities from neutral to -1.0% adding to a tactical cash overweight position now at +1.5%. The GIC left its allocation to global fixed income at -1.0%, but reduced the duration of U.S. dollar fixed income portfolios to neutral with several changes to sub-sectors. The GIC left its allocation to U.S. equities at neutral, but cut its allocation to European equities (ex-U.K.) to underweight. In anticipation of some further U.S. dollar appreciation and interest rate pressures, we also reduced some Southeast Asian equity weightings.

The election of Donald Trump with Republican control in the U.S. Congress creates a significantly less certain U.S. policy outlook compared to the gridlock that prevailed in recent years. While not certain, the unified government appears likely to succeed in passing sizeable U.S. corporate and personal income tax cuts. Increased U.S. infrastructure spending is also possible. These policies would represent a significant boost to U.S. growth, though likely no sooner than the second half of 2017. In contrast, possible disruptions to U.S. trade relationships, as discussed by then-candidate Trump, remain a downside risk for the world economy.

Fixed income markets have already moved to price in stronger U.S. growth, higher inflation and greater U.S. borrowing from the world. The U.S. dollar has risen sharply to a 13-year high.

So-called "announcement effects" have often accounted for the bulk of asset market movements on significant changes in expected policies. However, in our view, the probability of further increases in the U.S. dollar and concurrent global interest rate pressures has risen looking ahead.



Arrows indicate changes from previous GIC meeting.

With this in mind, we lowered the duration of U.S. investment grade corporate debt to neutral, while maintaining a significant overweight. We also reduced our allocation to U.S. municipal debt to neutral from overweight and added further to our overweight in short-term U.S. Treasuries as an alternative to cash. We maintain large underweights in government bonds in Europe and Japan.

US interest rate and currency pressures shocked emerging markets, with the largest hit to Latin America. However, we see valuations in the region as compelling and maintained overweights. The oil sector is likely to see no more than a temporary setback in its recovery. Conversely, we believe the U.K. referendum and U.S. presidential election highlight ongoing political risks in Europe, where inter-country cooperation is of greater financial importance than elsewhere. The long list of political hurdles over the coming year led us to reduce our equity allocation to underweight in the region.



Steven Wieting Global Chief Investment Strategist +1-212-559-0499 Steven.wieting@citi.com

Global Investment Strategy: Malcolm Spittler Maya Issa

EMEA Investment Strategy: Jeffrey Sacks Shan Gnanendran

Asia Investment Strategy: Ken Peng Shirley Wong

North America Investment Strategy: Chris Dhanraj

Latin America Investment Strategy: Jorge Amato

Fixed Income Strategy: Kris Xippolitos Joseph Kaplan

Like Brexit in the U.K, Trump's economic policies present substantial unknowns, both positive and negative risks for growth.

Reflation and Uncertainty

Remember New York in the 1980s? If only we could gobble up inflation-ravaged assets and ride the great wave of plunging interest rates, falling taxes and a surging U.S. dollar once again.

Unfortunately for investors, the world economy and asset values are not configured the same way as when Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981, near the start of a great secular bull market.


When "the Gipper" took office, the price/earnings multiple of the S&P 500 was 9 times compared to 18 times today. The U.S. 10-year Treasury yield was 11%. Inflation was 14% and on its way down. At the start of the Reagan administration, the top U.S. marginal tax rate was 70%. New York apartments traded at about one-eighth today's value per square foot, netting a price gain three times larger than the rise in U.S. inflation over the past 35 years.

The decline in inflation to 4.5% by the time Reagan left office, coupled with a far slower drop in interest rates, pushed up the U.S. dollar to a record high by 1985. This was followed by a multi-country agreement to weaken it reached at New York's Plaza Hotel – ironically, once owned by Donald Trump – in September of that year - **Figure 1** and **Figure 2**.

Figure 1: U.S. Inflation - CPI Y/Y%



Figure 2: Inflation-adjusted U.S. Trade-Weighted Dollar Index



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Bureau of Economic Research, as of October 2016. Note: Shaded region denotes periods of recession as defined by the NBER.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Bureau of Economic Research, as of October 2016. Note: Shaded region denotes periods of recession as defined by the NBER.

Surely, Trump's tax and deregulation proposals are Reagan-esque. While we are unsure about how far the Republican Congress will go along with a large deficit-financed infrastructure spending plan, we see across-the-board tax cuts as more likely, and the larger part of any stimulus. "Permanent" U.S. personal income and corporate tax cuts would amount to near 3% of U.S. GDP under the latest pre-election Trump plan.



12

10

It is possible that U.S. fiscal easing, just like the Fed's world-leading monetary stimulus of 2008, encourages others to do the same.

While many Reagan comparisons will be made, asset values and exchange rates are remarkably different from where they were when Reagan took office.

While not a certainty, sizeable tax cuts are likely to be implemented in the second half of 2017. The Republican-controlled Congress probably has few qualms about larger deficits if they result from a smaller tax-take from the private sector. The U.S. Congress may even succeed in "dynamically scoring" such a plan in budget forecasts to suggest that economic growth will limit any impact on future deficits and interest rates.

A "tax holiday" to repatriate retained corporate earnings held abroad at much-reduced rates is also likely, similar to the last such holiday in 2004/2005 (the "Homeland Investment Act" or HIA). While not a dominant factor, inflows from another HIA should add to upward pressure on the U.S. dollar heading into 2018, and limit some of the immediate inflationary impact of domestic stimulus so late in a U.S. recovery.

Unlike in 1981, however, inflation and interest rates in the U.S. are beginning to rise from very low levels, rather than falling from high levels. The U.S. fiscal position is not nearly as favorable looking forward as looking back - Figure 3 and Figure 4.

Figure 3: Social Security and Medicare

Over 65 Population Share % 180 22 Government Debt (Left) -65+ Population (Right) 160 140 등 120 100 80

Figure 4: U.S. Government Debt % and

Outlays as % of Federal Spending

41

39

Percent of Federal Outlays

27

80 83

Source: Haver Analytics as of November 16, 2016, Note: U.S. Social Security and Medicare spending is triggered at the age of 65.

Source: Haver Analytics as of November 16, 2016, All forecasts are expressions of opinion and are subject to change without notice and are not intended to be a quarantee of future events.

'00 '05

'10 '15 '20 '25

Unlike at the start of 1981, the U.S. dollar posted a significant historic gain from 2011-2016 already. Investors are already quite bullishly positioned in U.S. dollar assets -Figure 5. While the Federal Reserve is likely to tighten a bit more confidently if the projected Trump policy course plays out, we expect Fed tightening to lag behind inflation. A further U.S. dollar boom from present levels is far from assured.

60

40

20

'85 '90 '95



104 100 90 100 80 96 70 92 60 DXY Level 88 50 84 40 80 30 76 20 72 10 DXY (left) Net Long Postion (right) 68 0 '04 '06 '08 '10 '12 '14 '16

Figure 5: U.S. dollar Index and Net Speculative Futures Long Positions as % of Open Interest

Note: Open interest is the sum of all long and short positions.

Source: Haver Analytics as of November 8, 2016. Indices are unmanaged. An investor cannot invest directly in an index. They are shown for illustrative purposes only and do not represent the performance of any specific investment.

A large fiscal stimulus late in the current recovery represents a high risk, high reward gamble to accelerate U.S. growth. It possibly may work.

The Trump's campaign's tax and spending policies appear to represent a "high risk, high reward" gamble to accelerate U.S. growth. Using a U.S. football metaphor, it could be called a "hail Mary pass." Yet the risk of bust it presents would likely only follow if it achieves a boom.

With our earlier caveats on long-term U.S. budget dynamics and worries about trade policy – see below – it is only fair to acknowledge Trump's fiscal plans have a chance of working as intended. As **figure 6** shows, the growth of the U.S. labor force has been weaker than demographics would imply in the U.S. economic recovery to date. Only in the past year has the U.S. labor force expanded convincingly. This made us increasingly optimistic about the U.S. outlook prior to the election – see our Mid-year-Outlook 2016. The stronger policy incentives, including reduced taxes on labor income and business creation, could extend this trend.

Meanwhile, for a variety of reasons beyond our scope here, U.S. productivity growth in the recovery to date has been the weakest since the early 1980s - **figure 7**. While productivity growth is extraordinarily hard to predict, we can foresee a number of reasons why this ultra-slow trend should not continue.


Both labor force and productivity data may point to a strengthening in U.S. potential growth during a period when fiscal easing boosts demand. While repatriating foreign profits should work no better in 2017 than it did in 2005 in boosting U.S. investment spending, lower taxes on capital formation and reduced regulation could help move the needle, with so many incentives working in tandem.



As usual, hard data are lacking to measure the impact of the election itself on the U.S. economy. U.S. consumer confidence readings in a week's time could be notable. Perhaps even more interesting, however, will be the small business confidence reading from the National Association of Independent Business on December 13. It would not surprise us to see a rise in small business spirits on the mere prospect of reduced healthcare contribution costs and promises of reduced regulation.

Figure 6: Prime Age Labor Force Participation

Figure 7: U.S. Productivity Growth (5-Year Average)



Note: Prime age is counted as 25-54.

Source: Haver Analytics as of November 14, 2016.

Source: Haver Analytics as of November 17, 2016.

Brexit, Trump and Beyond

We consider Brexit in the U.K. to be the same underlying, nativist political movement that elected Donald Trump. The U.K. Independence party's Nigel Farage and Donald Trump even campaigned together in the U.S. Depending on how this impact repeats itself in Europe, if it indeed does, investors should prepare for a tense year ahead, especially given the greater importance of political cooperation there for financial and economic stability.

In the case of Brexit, global investors looked at the sharp decline in Sterling as a buying opportunity. There were significant hopes that the divorce with the European Union (E.U.) would either not be implemented, or that the costs of leaving would be made negligible. However, when the May administration vowed three months later to keep the "Leave" campaign's promises to regain control over immigration from the E.U. – regardless of the consequences for London's finance sector – Sterling dropped another 8% after an initial decline of 10%. Fascinatingly, the Mexican peso has shown the same initial reaction as Sterling, although it was far more lowly valued than Sterling was to begin with – **figure 8**.


Amid the joy over prospects of fiscal easing, might President Trump not choose to keep any of the campaign promises that markets have feared? In the U.S. case, we are worried about a potentially acrimonious turn in relations with China – **figure 9**. Lurches in the course of Chinese devaluation coincided with global stock market corrections in both August 2015 and January 2016.

The U.S. Presidential election and Brexit represent the same political movement. We should expect repeats elsewhere.



Figure 8: U.K. Pound and Mexican Peso (time lagged)

Figure 9: Chinese Yuan/USD and Global Equities





Source: Haver Analytics as of November 14, 2016.


Source: FactSet, The Yield Book, as of November 14, 2016. Indices are unmanaged. An investor cannot invest directly in an index. They are shown for illustrative purposes only and do not represent the performance of any specific investment.

The two possible U.S. election outcomes differ not only in terms of policy, but also in terms of *predictability*. Assessing the outlook under a future Trump administration is not quite as simple as taking Obama/Clinton policy and adding tax cuts plus de-regulation – **figure 10**.

"It's our dollar, but it's your problem." And so it is again.

With this higher uncertainty in mind, the Citi Private Bank Global Investment Committee decided to make asset allocation changes once again in the direction of reducing risk. This included reducing the duration of U.S. bond portfolios to neutral. In equities, we reduced international exposures for reasons of both domestic politics (Europe) and concerns over U.S. interest rates (Southeast Asia). As Richard Nixon's Treasury Secretary once famously said, "it's our dollar, but it's your problem." And so it is again.

Figure 10: U.S. Policy Uncertainty Index (Seven Day Moving Average)



Source: Haver Analytics as of November 18, 2016.

Swiftly priced
"announcement
effects" could represent
the bulk of the nearterm move in interest
rates and other asset
prices with the election
of Donald Trump.

However, we still choose to modestly reduce interest rate risk in our allocations.




As **figure 11** shows, expected U.S. interest rate volatility has jumped sharply while U.S. equities have remained calm. A violent sector rotation masks turmoil beneath the surface – **figure 12**.

The divergence in expected volatility is unusual, and unlikely to continue without challenge. Higher rates simply must impact other asset classes at some point. While we don't expect to see "high" absolute interest rates or high rates of inflation, nearly all developed market asset valuations currently reflect *low for both*.

Figure 11: Implied U.S. Treasury Volatility vs U.S. Equity Volatility

Figure 12: S&P Economic Sectors: Strong Rotation



Source: Haver Analytics as of November 14, 2016. Indices are unmanaged. An investor cannot invest directly in an index. They are shown for illustrative purposes only and do not represent the performance of any specific Source: Standard & Poor's, Citi Private Bank as of November 11, 2016. Indices are unmanaged. An investor cannot invest directly in an index. They are shown for illustrative purposes only and do not represent the performance of any specific investment.

When we consider the extent of the sector rotation – positive for financials and industrials, negative for utilities and staples – and the *speed* at which rates have risen, we would note the tendency for well-functioning, efficient markets to make very large moves on announcement effects. As example, central banks have achieved the bulk of their market impact from quantitative easing simply by announcing policy changes, long before actually purchasing any assets. So it may prove with U.S. fiscal easing that will have to go through a tortured legislative process a half year or more from now.

We reduce bond portfolio duration to neutral. It may also be time to consider hedging U.S.-dollar floating rate liabilities. However, with the likelihood of substantial fiscal easing late on into a U.S. recovery, we must consider inflationary consequences somewhat more seriously than we have in long time. Consider the challenge for asset allocation: in periods where high inflation and rising bond yields drove U.S. equity bear markets (1965-1984), the total return on long-term U.S. Treasuries was +0.4%. During those periods, U.S. equity declines averaged a drop of 27%. Since 1985 on the other hand, a period of disinflation, U.S. Treasury returns were +11.5% during the bear markets declines (-29% on average). In other words, asset markets tend to be uncorrelated in periods of low inflation, and more highly correlated when they are driven lower by the trend of destabilizing inflation.

Global interest rates were already trending modestly higher in advance of the U.S. election – see last month's Quadrant World Bond Market Exhales. Ahead of the U.S. election, our underweight positions in most government bonds outside of the U.S. helped offset weakness elsewhere in the portfolio, such as our overweights in gold and




A stronger U.S. dollar and higher rates has pushed down gold initially, but we maintain a small overweight in both gold and TIPs as an inflation hedge.

Latin American debt. While we believe U.S. yield premiums still offer an attractive opportunity for global investors, particularly corporate securities, we reduced portfolio duration to neutral, given the more uncertain interest rate outlook and consequently greater risk.

Given the possibility of significant income tax cuts and a tightening of spreads to U.S. Treasuries, we also reduced the U.S. municipal debt weighting to neutral. For U.S. income tax payers, munis will still represent a core holding that can achieve a higher post-tax return than most comparably-rated corporates – figure 13. For investors able to take advantage of this tax differential, we still hold munis instead of corporates. Yet for other global investors, the municipal bond yield advantage to Treasuries has vanished.

Meanwhile, for those sensitive to U.S. floating interest rate liabilities, the new wider range of interest rate possibilities the new U.S. administration represents may well argue for hedging interest rate exposure going forward.

Figure 13: A-Rated Corporate Bonds and Municipal Bonds (Tax Equivalent Yield)



Note: Tax equivalent yields are calculated with current tax rates.

Source: Bloomberg as of November 17, 2016.

The U.S. dollar has rallied sharply on the prospect of U.S. stimulus – as well as consequently higher interest rates – and policies that "put U.S. interests first." At least over a short-term time frame, the reinvigorated dollar could continue to dampen U.S. inflation pressures, ironically by improving the trade competitiveness of imports – figure 14. However, we continue to hold small overweight positions in both gold and U.S. Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) with a view to seeking compensation for a higher inflation rate.



25 -25 Import Prices (Left) 20 -20 Dollar (Right, Inverted) 15 Year-to-Year Pct Chg 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 15 -20 20 '90 '94 '98 '02 '06 '10 '15

Figure 14: Import Prices and the Trade-Weighted U.S. dollar

Source: Haver Analytics as of November 15, 2016.

Oil and Emerging Markets


The stronger U.S. dollar – as well as President-elect Trump's desire to seek the maximum U.S. energy production – represents a fresh challenge for the oil sector and closely-linked asset markets. However, we see it as a mere setback. Production decisions in the U.S. are quite different from those of state-owned producers elsewhere. The U.S. could gain a larger share of global oil markets under President Trump than under Obama/Clinton, and at a somewhat lower oil price. However, potential profits will still drive U.S. production and investment. With the fall in oil from \$115 to a low of \$27 at the start of 2016, U.S. and global petroleum industry investment has fallen 60% over two years – figure 15. The path of recovery may only be slowed marginally.

Profits, not "command decisions" will drive oil production in the U.S.



Figure 15: U.S. Capital Investment in Petroleum and Gas (inflation adjusted)

Latin American asset markets made the largest drop within EM. Their valuation remains the best in EM.




Source: Haver Analytics as of November 16, 2016.

For commodity sensitive emerging markets, the story is the same. The spike in the U.S. dollar and interest rates has set back Latin American EM harder than other regions – **figure 16**. We now see a greater risk to the region, yet asset values are attractive after sharp declines from 2011-2015 – **figure 17**. In particular, Brazil's trade linkages to the U.S. are modest and local interest rates are competitive enough to attract savings inflows barring a very sharp rise in U.S. rates.

Figure 16: EM Bond Total Returns Since Election

Figure 17: German and Brazilian Sovereign Bond Yields




Source: The Yield Book as of November 16, 2016. Past performance is no guarantee of future returns. Real results may vary.

Source: Haver Analytics as of November 16, 2016.



The case of Mexico is now far riskier from a U.S. trade policy perspective. Yet Mexico's real effective exchange rate has already fallen to levels just below the advent of the North American Free Trade Agreement – **figure 18**. When political risks become clearer, or if the exchange rate overshoots further, the country's assets may present a future buying opportunity.

Figure 18: Mexican Peso (Real Effective Exchange Rate)



Source: Bloomberg as of November 16, 2016.

Some Asian asset markets resisted the impact of the Trump-inspired U.S. dollar surge better than others. The same is true when looking at the longer period of U.S. dollar strength beginning in 2011. The richly-valued markets of Singapore, Philippines and Thailand are now small underweights as U.S. trade and exchange rate risks have risen.

Finally, the largest cut we have made is to European equities excluding the U.K. Valuations and monetary policy are supportive – **figure 19**. However, any repeat of the nativist, populist political victories in the Eurozone would have different consequences than in the U.S. or U.K. case. Mere questions over the durability of the monetary union can create market dislocations, as was seen in 2012. While it is possible that cohesion will hold for each and every Euro member, the European political calendar over the coming twelve months will likely herald many rounds of apprehension and suspense – **figure 20**.

For those tired of political uncertainty, Europe in particular offers no reprieve in 2017.



8 7 6 5 Yield (%) 3 2 Euro Stoxx 50 dividend yield 1 Euro IG corporate bond yield 0 '08 '10 '02 '04 '06 '12 '14 '16

Figure 19: Euro Stoxx Dividends and Euro IG Corporate Bond Yields

Source: Bloomberg as of November 16, 2016. Indices are unmanaged. An investor cannot invest directly in an index. They are shown for illustrative purposes only and do not represent the performance of any specific investment.

Figure 20: Timeline of Key Elections and Signposts 2016-2018

| 20 |)16 | | 20 | 017 | | 20 | 18 | |
|--|----------------------|------------------------------------|---|---|---|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| Nov | 4 Dec | 31 Jan | March | 23 Apr, 7 May | 2H of 2017 | March, TBC* | 6 Nov | |
| U.S. Presidential Election (8 Nov) French Conservative Party Primaries (20 Nov, 27* Nov TBC) | Austrian Election | EU-Russia Sanctions Renewed? | Article 50 Triggered In UK (by end of March) Dutch general Election (15 March) | French Presidential Election 1st + 2nd Rounds | German Federal Election (Aug 27 – Oct 22, TBC*) 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China | Russian Presidential Election | US Mid-Term Elections | Other snap elections or referendums ? |

Source: Citi Research and Bloomberg as of November 17, 2016.



Portfolio allocations

This section shows the strategic and tactical allocations for Risk Levels 1 to 5 set by Citi Private Bank's Global Investment Committee on November 17, 2016. Recommend allocations reflect annual rebalancing and model revisions.

Risk Level 1

Risk Level 1 is designed for investors who have a preference for capital preservation and relative safety over the potential for a return on investment. These investors prefer to hold cash, time deposits and/or lower risk fixed income instruments.

| Classification | Strategic (%) | Tactical* (%) | Active (%) |
|--|------------------|------------------|------------|
| Cash | 9.7 | 9.7 | 0.0 |
| Fixed income | 82.3 | 82.3 | 0.0 |
| Developed Investment Grade | 70.8 | 69.6 | -1.2 |
| Developed national, supranational and regional | 43.6 | 39.8 | -3.8 |
| Americas | 15.0 | 16.0 | 1.0 |
| EMEA | 18.0 | 16.0 | -2.0 |
| U.K. | 3.7 | 3.6 | -0.0 |
| Core Europe | 8.0 | 7.1 | -0.9 |
| Peripheral Europe | 5.8 | 4.8 | -0.9 |
| Others | 0.6 | 0.5 | -0.1 |
| Asia | 9.8 | 6.9 | -2.9 |
| Asia (ex Japan) | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.1 |
| Japan | 9.5 | 6.5 | -3.0 |
| Supranational | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.0 |
| Developed corporate investment grade | 27.2 | 29.8 | 2.6 |
| Americas | 19.4 | 21.8 | 2.4 |
| U.S. | 18.7 | 21.0 | 2.4 |
| Canada | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.0 |
| EMEA | 7.7 | 7.9 | 0.2 |
| Europe (ex U.K.) | 5.9 | 6.0 | 0.1 |
| U.K. | 1.8 | 1.8 | 0.0 |
| Asia | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Asia (ex Japan) | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Japan | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |


| Classification | Strategic (%) | Tactical* (%) | Active (%) |
|----------------------|---------------|---------------|------------|
| Developed high yield | 5.8 | 6.6 | 0.9 |
| Americas | 4.4 | 4.9 | 0.4 |
| EMEA | 1.3 | 1.8 | 0.4 |
| Emerging market debt | 5.8 | 6.1 | 0.3 |
| Americas | 0.7 | 1.0 | 0.3 |
| EMEA | 0.7 | 0.7 | -0.0 |
| Asia | 4.4 | 4.5 | 0.1 |
| Equities | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Developed Equities | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Emerging Equities | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Hybrid investments | 8.0 | 8.0 | 0.0 |
| Hedge funds | 8.0 | 8.0 | 0.0 |
| Real Assets | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Commodities | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 |

Strategic = benchmark; tactical = the Citi Private Bank Global Investment Committee's current view; and active = the difference between strategic and tactical. MBS = mortgage-backed securities; ABS = asset-backed securities. All allocations are subject to change at discretion of the GIC of the Citi Private Bank. *The tactical allocation corresponds to a maturity of 7 to 10 years. Minor differences may result due to rounding.



Risk Level 1: tactical allocations





Figures in brackets are the difference versus the strategic benchmark

Strategic = benchmark; tactical = the Citi Private Bank Global Investment Committee's current view; and active = the difference between strategic and tactical. All allocations are subject to change at discretion of the GIC of the Citi Private Bank.

Core positions

- Global equities, global fixed income, cash and commodities are all at neutral position.
- Within fixed income, developed sovereign continues to be the largest underweight at -3.8%. Developed corporate investment grade fixed income remains the largest overweight at +2.6% followed by high-yield at 0.9% overweight position.
- EM fixed income remains at a small overweight position of 0.3% with both Latin America and Asia debt in overweight positions.
- Within equities, both developed and EM equities remain at neutral allocation.



Risk Level 2

Risk Level 2 is designed for investors who emphasize capital preservation over return on investment, but who are willing to subject some portion of their principal to increased risk in order to generate a potentially greater rate of return on investment.

| Classification | Strategic (%) | Tactical* (%) | Active (%) |
|--|------------------|------------------|---------------|
| Cash | 8.0 | 9.0 | 1.0 |
| Fixed income | 53.0 | 52.3 | -0.7 |
| Developed Investment Grade | 49.8 | 47.9 | -1.9 |
| Developed national, supranational and regional | 30.6 | 26.0 | -4.7 |
| Americas | 10.5 | 11.5 | 1.0 |
| EMEA | 12.7 | 10.3 | -2.4 |
| U.K. | 2.6 | 2.5 | -0.1 |
| Core Europe | 5.6 | 4.6 | -1.1 |
| Peripheral Europe | 4.0 | 3.0 | -1.1 |
| Others | 0.4 | 0.3 | -0.2 |
| Asia | 6.9 | 3.6 | -3.3 |
| Asia (ex Japan) | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| Japan | 6.7 | 3.3 | -3.4 |
| Supranational | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.0 |
| Developed corporate investment grade | 19.1 | 21.9 | 2.7 |
| Americas | 13.6 | 16.3 | 2.6 |
| U.S. | 13.1 | 15.7 | 2.6 |
| Canada | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.0 |
| EMEA | 5.4 | 5.5 | 0.1 |
| Europe (ex U.K.) | 4.1 | 4.2 | 0.1 |
| U.K. | 1.3 | 1.3 | 0.0 |
| Asia | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Developed high yield | 1.6 | 2.5 | 0.9 |
| Americas | 1.2 | 1.8 | 0.5 |
| EMEA | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.4 |
| Emerging market debt | 1.6 | 1.9 | 0.3 |
| Americas | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.2 |
| EMEA | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Asia | 1.2 | 1.4 | 0.2 |
| Hybrid investments | 14.0 | 14.0 | 0.0 |
| Hedge funds | 14.0 | 14.0 | 0.0 |
| Real assets | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| Commodities | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.3 |


| Classification | Strategic (%) | Tactical* (%) | Active (%) |
|---------------------------------------|------------------|------------------|---------------|
| Equities | 25.0 | 24.4 | -0.7 |
| Developed Equities | 21.8 | 21.2 | -0.6 |
| Developed large | 18.9 | 18.4 | -0.5 |
| cap equities | | | |
| Americas | 11.9 | 11.8 | -0.2 |
| U.S. all | 11.3 | 11.1 | -0.2 |
| Canada | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.0 |
| EMEA | 4.4 | 4.2 | -0.2 |
| U.K. | 1.4 | 1.4 | 0.0 |
| Germany | 0.6 | 0.5 | -0.1 |
| France | 0.6 | 0.6 | -0.1 |
| Switzerland | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.0 |
| Benelux | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
| Scandi | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.0 |
| Spain | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Italy | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Others | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Asia | 2.5 | 2.5 | -0.1 |
| Australasia | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.0 |
| Far East ex Japan | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
| Japan . | 1.7 | 1.7 | 0.0 |
| Developed small/ mid cap equities | 2.9 | 2.8 | -0.1 |
| Americas | 1.7 | 1.6 | 0.0 |
| EMEA | 0.8 | 0.7 | -0.1 |
| Europe (ex U.K.) | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.0 |
| U.K. | 0.2 | 0.1 | -0.1 |
| Asia | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.0 |
| Asia (ex Japan) | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Japan | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
| Emerging all cap equities | 3.2 | 3.2 | 0.0 |
| Americas | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.1 |
| Brazil | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Mexico | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Other | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| EMEA | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.0 |
| Turkey | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Russia and Eastern Europe | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| South Africa | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Other | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Asia | 2.3 | 2.2 | -0.1 |
| China | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.0 |
| India | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.0 |
| South Korea | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.0 |
| Taiwan | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.0 |
| Other Emerging Asia | 0.3 | 0.3 | -0.1 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 |
| ent view: and active = the difference | | | |

Strategic = benchmark; tactical = the Citi Private Bank Global Investment Committee's current view; and active = the difference between strategic and tactical. MBS = mortgage-backed securities; ABS = asset-backed securities. All allocations are subject to change at discretion of the GIC of the Citi Private Bank. *The tactical allocation corresponds to a maturity of 7 to 10 years. Minor differences may result due to rounding.



Risk Level 2: tactical allocations





Figures in brackets are the difference versus the strategic benchmark

Strategic = benchmark; tactical = the Citi Private Bank Global Investment Committee's current view; and active = the difference between strategic and tactical. All allocations are subject to change at discretion of the GIC of the Citi Private Bank.

Core positions

- Global equities have an underweight position of -0.7% with global fixed income underweight maintained at -0.7%. Cash overweight is increased to +1.0%.
- Gold remains at a small overweight position of +0.3%.
- Within fixed income, developed sovereign remains the largest underweight at -4.7% and developed corporate investment grade the largest overweight at +2.7% followed by high-yield at +0.9%.
- Emerging market fixed income remains at an overweight position of 0.3% with both Latin America and Asia at overweight positions and EMEA at neutral allocation.
- Within equities, underweight in developed equities is increased to -0.6%.
- Emerging market equities are brought down to neutral position from slight overweight.



Risk Level 3

Risk Level 3 is designed for investors with a blended objective who require a mix of assets and seek a balance between investments that offer income and those positioned for a potentially higher return on investment. Risk Level 3 may be appropriate for investors willing to subject their portfolio to additional risk for potential growth in addition to a level of income reflective of his/her stated risk tolerance.


| Classification | Strategic (%) | Tactical* (%) | Active (%) |
|--|------------------|------------------|---------------|
| Cash | 2.0 | 3.5 | 1.5 |
| Fixed income | 30.0 | 29.0 | -1.0 |
| Developed Investment Grade | 27.0 | 25.0 | -2.0 |
| Developed national, supranational and regional | 16.6 | 12.7 | -3.9 |
| Americas | 5.7 | 6.2 | 0.5 |
| EMEA | 6.9 | 4.9 | -1.9 |
| U.K. | 1.4 | 1.3 | -0.1 |
| Core Europe | 3.0 | 2.2 | -0.9 |
| Peripheral Europe | 2.2 | 1.4 | -0.8 |
| Others | 0.2 | 0.1 | -0.1 |
| Asia | 3.7 | 1.2 | -2.5 |
| Asia (ex Japan) | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| Japan | 3.6 | 1.0 | -2.6 |
| Supranational | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
| Developed corporate investment grade | 10.4 | 12.3 | 2.0 |
| Americas | 7.4 | 9.4 | 2.0 |
| U.S. | 7.1 | 9.1 | 2.0 |
| Canada | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
| EMEA | 2.9 | 2.9 | 0.0 |
| Europe (ex U.K.) | 2.2 | 2.2 | 0.0 |
| U.K. | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.0 |
| Asia | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Developed high yield | 2.0 | 2.7 | 0.7 |
| Americas | 1.6 | 1.9 | 0.3 |
| EMEA | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.4 |
| Emerging market debt | 1.0 | 1.3 | 0.3 |
| Americas | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| EMEA | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Asia | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.1 |
| Hybrid investments | 16.0 | 16.0 | 0.0 |
| Hedge funds | 16.0 | 16.0 | 0.0 |
| Real assets | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| Commodities | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.5 |


| Classification | Strategic (%) | Tactical* (%) | Active (%) |
|--------------------------------------|------------------|------------------|---------------|
| Equities | 52.0 | 51.0 | -1.0 |
| Developed Equities | 45.3 | 44.3 | -1.1 |
| Developed large cap equities | 39.3 | 38.5 | -0.7 |
| Americas | 24.8 | 24.8 | 0.0 |
| U.S. all | 23.5 | 23.5 | 0.0 |
| Canada | 1.4 | 1.4 | 0.0 |
| EMEA | 9.1 | 8.6 | -0.6 |
| U.K. | 3.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 |
| Germany | 1.2 | 1.0 | -0.2 |
| France | 1.3 | 1.1 | -0.2 |
| Switzerland | 1.4 | 1.3 | -0.1 |
| Benelux | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.0 |
| Scandi | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.0 |
| Spain | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.0 |
| ltaly | 0.3 | 0.2 | -0.1 |
| Others | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Asia | 5.3 | 5.1 | -0.1 |
| Australasia | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 |
| Far East ex Japan | 0.7 | 0.6 | -0.1 |
| Japan | 3.6 | 3.6 | 0.0 |
| Developed small/ mid cap equities | 6.1 | 5.8 | -0.3 |
| Americas | 3.5 | 3.5 | 0.0 |
| EMEA | 1.7 | 1.4 | -0.3 |
| Europe (ex U.K.) | 1.3 | 1.2 | -0.1 |
| U.K. | 0.4 | 0.2 | -0.2 |
| Asia | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.0 |
| Asia (ex Japan) | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Japan | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.0 |
| Emerging all cap equities | 6.7 | 6.7 | 0.1 |
| Americas | 0.8 | 1.1 | 0.3 |
| Brazil | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.0 |
| Mexico | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
| Other | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| EMEA | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 |
| Turkey | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Russia and | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.0 |
| South Africa | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.0 |
| Other | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Asia | 4.8 | 4.6 | -0.2 |
| China | 1.5 | 1.5 | 0.0 |
| India | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.0 |
| South Korea | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 |
| Taiwan | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.0 |
| Other Emerging Asia | 0.7 | 0.5 | -0.2 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 |

Strategic = benchmark; tactical = the Citi Private Bank Global Investment Committee's current view; and active = the difference between strategic and tactical. MBS = mortgage-backed securities; ABS = asset-backed securities. All allocations are subject to change at discretion of the GIC of the Citi Private Bank. *The tactical allocation corresponds to a maturity of 7 to 10 years. Minor differences may result due to rounding.



Risk Level 3: tactical allocations





Figures in brackets are the difference versus the strategic benchmark

Strategic = benchmark; tactical = the Citi Private Bank Global Investment Committee's current view; and active = the difference between strategic and tactical. All allocations are subject to change at discretion of the GIC of the Citi Private Bank.

Core positions

- Global equities are reduced to an underweight position of -1.0% from neutral with global fixed income underweight maintained at -1.0%. Cash is now at an increased overweight position of +1.5% with gold remained at a small overweight of 0.5%.
- Within fixed income, developed sovereign remains the largest underweight at -3.9%, with U.S. government debt at an overweight position. Developed corporate investment grade remains the largest overweight at +2.0% followed by high-yield at +0.7%.
- Emerging market fixed income remains at a small overweight position of +0.3% with both Latin America and Asia at overweight positions and EMEA at neutral allocation.
- Within equities, developed market equities are now at an increased underweight position of -1.1% driven by reduced position in Europe ex-U.K. equities.
- Overweight in Emerging equities is reduced to +0.1% driven by underweight in Asian equities.



Risk Level 4

Risk Level 4 is designed for investors with a blended objective who require a mix of assets and seek a balance between investments that offer income and those positioned for a potentially higher return on investment. They are willing to subject a large portion of their portfolio to greater risk and market value fluctuations in anticipation of a potentially greater return on investment. Investors may have a preference for investments or trading strategies that may assume higher-than-normal market risks and/or potentially less liquidity with the goal (but not guarantee) of commensurate gains.

| Classification | Strategic (%) | Tactical* (%) | Active (%) |
|--|------------------|------------------|---------------|
| Cash | 0.0 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| Fixed income | 14.3 | 13.2 | -1.1 |
| Developed Investment Grade | 12.3 | 10.8 | -1.5 |
| Developed national, supranational and regional | 7.6 | 5.4 | -2.2 |
| Americas | 2.6 | 2.7 | 0.1 |
| EMEA | 3.1 | 2.1 | -1.0 |
| U.K. | 0.6 | 0.6 | -0.1 |
| Core Europe | 1.4 | 0.9 | -0.5 |
| Peripheral | 1.0 | 0.6 | -0.4 |
| Others | 0.1 | 0.0 | -0.1 |
| Asia | 1.7 | 0.5 | -1.2 |
| Asia (ex Japan) | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Japan | 1.7 | 0.4 | -1.3 |
| Supranational | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Developed corporate investment grade | 4.7 | 5.4 | 0.7 |
| Americas | 3.4 | 4.2 | 0.8 |
| U.S. | 3.2 | 4.0 | 0.8 |
| Canada | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| EMEA | 1.3 | 1.3 | -0.1 |
| Europe (ex U.K.) | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 |
| U.K. | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
| Asia | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Developed high yield | 1.0 | 1.3 | 0.3 |
| Americas | 8.0 | 0.9 | 0.1 |
| EMEA | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.2 |
| Emerging market debt | 1.0 | 1.1 | 0.1 |
| Americas | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| EMEA | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Asia | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.0 |
| Hybrid investments | 18.0 | 18.0 | 0.0 |
| Hedge funds | 18.0 | 18.0 | 0.0 |
| Real assets | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| Commodities | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.5 |


| Classification | Strategic (%) | Tactical* (%) | Active (%) |
|----------------------------------|------------------|------------------|---------------|
| Equities | 67.7 | 66.6 | -1.1 |
| Developed Equities | 59.0 | 57.8 | -1.2 |
| Developed large cap equities | 51.1 | 50.3 | -0.8 |
| Americas | 32.3 | 32.5 | 0.2 |
| U.S. all | 30.6 | 30.7 | 0.1 |
| Canada | 1.8 | 1.8 | 0.0 |
| EMEA | 11.9 | 11.1 | -0.8 |
| U.K. | 3.9 | 3.9 | 0.0 |
| Germany | 1.5 | 1.3 | -0.2 |
| France | 1.7 | 1.5 | -0.2 |
| Switzerland | 1.8 | 1.7 | -0.1 |
| Benelux | 0.8 | 0.7 | -0.1 |
| Scandi | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 |
| Spain | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.0 |
| Italy | 0.4 | 0.3 | -0.1 |
| Others | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Asia | 6.9 | 6.7 | -0.2 |
| Australasia | 1.3 | 1.3 | -0.1 |
| Far East ex Japan | 0.9 | 0.7 | -0.1 |
| Japan . | 4.7 | 4.7 | 0.0 |
| Developed small/mid cap equities | 7.9 | 7.5 | -0.4 |
| Americas | 4.5 | 4.5 | 0.0 |
| EMEA | 2.3 | 1.8 | -0.4 |
| Europe (ex U.K.) | 1.7 | 1.5 | -0.2 |
| U.K. | 0.6 | 0.3 | -0.3 |
| Asia | 1.1 | 1.2 | 0.0 |
| Asia (ex Japan) | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
| Japan | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.0 |
| Emerging all cap equities | 8.7 | 8.8 | 0.1 |
| Americas | 1.1 | 1.5 | 0.4 |
| Brazil | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.0 |
| Mexico | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.0 |
| Other | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.4 |
| EMEA | 1.4 | 1.4 | 0.0 |
| Turkey | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Russia and Eastern Europe | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.0 |
| South Africa | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.0 |
| Other | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Asia | 6.2 | 6.0 | -0.3 |
| China | 1.9 | 2.0 | 0.0 |
| India | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 |
| South Korea | 1.4 | 1.4 | 0.0 |
| Taiwan | 1.1 | 1.1 | 0.0 |
| Other Emerging Asia | 0.9 | 0.6 | -0.3 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 |

Strategic = benchmark; tactical = the Citi Private Bank Global Investment Committee's current view; and active = the difference between strategic and tactical. MBS = mortgage-backed securities; ABS = asset-backed securities. All allocations are subject to change at discretion of the GIC of the Citi Private Bank. *The tactical allocation corresponds to a maturity of 7 to 10 years. Minor differences may result due to rounding.



Risk Level 4: tactical allocations





Figures in brackets are the difference versus the strategic benchmark

Strategic = benchmark; tactical = the Citi Private Bank Global Investment Committee's current view; and active = the difference between strategic and tactical. All allocations are subject to change at discretion of the GIC of the Citi Private Bank.

Core positions

- Global equities are reduced to an underweight position at -1.1% from neutral with global fixed income underweight maintained at -1.1%. Cash overweight is increased to +1.6% with gold remained at an overweight position of 0.5%.
- Within fixed income, developed sovereign remains the largest underweight at -2.2% and developed corporate investment grade largest overweight at +0.7%.
- Both emerging debt and high yield fixed income remain at small overweight positions.
- Within equities, developed equities underweight is increased to -1.2% driven by underweight positions in Europe ex-U.K. equities, both large cap and small/mid cap.
- Emerging equities overweight is reduced to +0.1%.



Risk Level 5

Risk Level 5 is designed for investors who emphasize return on investment. They are willing to subject their entire portfolio to greater risk and market value fluctuations in anticipation of a potentially greater return on investments. Investors may have a preference for investments or trading strategies that may assume higher-than-normal market risks and/or potentially less liquidity with the goal (but not guarantee) of commensurate gains. Clients may engage in tactical or opportunistic trading, which may involve higher volatility and variability of returns.

| | Strategic | Tactical* | Active |
|--|-----------|-----------|--------|
| Classification | (%) | (%) | (%) |
| Cash | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Fixed income | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Developed Investment Grade | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Developed national, supranational and regional | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Developed Corporate Investment Grade | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Americas | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| EMEA | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Europe (ex U.K.) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| U.K. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Asia | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Asia (ex Japan) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Japan | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Developed high yield | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Americas | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| EMEA | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Asia | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Emerging market debt | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Americas | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| EMEA | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Asia | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Equities | 80.0 | 80.0 | 0.0 |
| Global Developed Equities | 69.8 | 69.4 | -0.3 |
| Developed large cap equities | 60.4 | 60.4 | 0.0 |
| Americas | 38.2 | 39.1 | 0.9 |
| U.S. all | 36.1 | 36.9 | 0.8 |
| Canada | 2.1 | 2.1 | 0.0 |
| EMEA | 14.1 | 13.3 | -0.7 |
| U.K. | 4.6 | 4.7 | 0.1 |
| Germany | 1.8 | 1.6 | -0.3 |
| France | 2.0 | 1.8 | -0.3 |
| Switzerland | 2.2 | 2.1 | -0.1 |
| Benelux | 0.9 | 0.9 | -0.1 |
| Scandi | 1.2 | 1.2 | 0.0 |
| Spain | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.0 |
| Italy | 0.5 | 0.3 | -0.1 |
| Others | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 |


| Classification | Strategic (%) | Tactical* (%) | Active (%) |
|----------------------------------|------------------|------------------|---------------|
| Asia | 8.1 | 8.1 | -0.1 |
| Australasia | 1.6 | 1.5 | 0.0 |
| Far East ex Japan | 1.0 | 0.8 | -0.2 |
| Japan | 5.6 | 5.7 | 0.1 |
| Developed small/mid cap equities | 9.4 | 9.0 | -0.4 |
| Americas | 5.3 | 5.4 | 0.1 |
| EMEA | 2.7 | 2.2 | -0.5 |
| Europe (ex U.K.) | 2.0 | 1.8 | -0.2 |
| U.K. | 0.7 | 0.3 | -0.3 |
| Asia | 1.4 | 1.4 | 0.0 |
| Asia (ex Japan) | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
| Japan | 1.0 | 1.1 | 0.0 |
| Emerging all cap equities | 10.2 | 10.6 | 0.3 |
| Americas | 1.3 | 1.8 | 0.5 |
| Brazil | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.0 |
| Mexico | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.0 |
| Other | 0.2 | 0.7 | 0.5 |
| EMEA | 1.6 | 1.6 | 0.0 |
| Turkey | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Russia and Eastern Europe | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.0 |
| South Africa | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.0 |
| Other | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Asia | 7.4 | 7.2 | -0.2 |
| China | 2.3 | 2.4 | 0.1 |
| India | 1.1 | 1.2 | 0.0 |
| South Korea | 1.6 | 1.6 | 0.0 |
| Taiwan | 1.3 | 1.3 | 0.0 |
| Other Emerging Asia | 1.0 | 0.7 | -0.3 |
| Hybrid investments | 20.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 |
| Hedge funds | 20.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 |
| Real assets | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Commodities | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Gold | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 |

Strategic = benchmark; tactical = the Citi Private Bank Global Investment Committee's current view; and active = the difference between strategic and tactical. MBS = mortgage-backed securities; ABS = asset-backed securities. All allocations are subject to change at discretion of the GIC of the Citi Private Bank. Minor differences may result due to rounding.



Risk Level 5: tactical allocations





Figures in brackets are the difference versus the strategic benchmark

Strategic = benchmark; tactical = the Citi Private Bank Global Investment Committee's current view; and active = the difference between strategic and tactical. All allocations are subject to change at discretion of the GIC of the Citi Private Bank.

Core positions

- Developed equities are at small underweight position of -0.3% and emerging equities at small overweight position of +0.3%.
- Underweight in developed equities are driven by underweight EMEA equities, both large cap and small/mid cap.
- Within emerging equities, Latin American equities remain at +0.5% overweight position with EMEA at neutral allocation.



Asset allocation definitions

| Asset classes | Benchmarked against |
|---|---|
| Global equities | MSCI All Country World Index, which represents 48 developed and emerging equity markets. Index components are weighted by market capitalization. |
| Global bonds | Barclays Capital Multiverse (Hedged) Index, which contains the government -related portion of the Multiverse Index, and accounts for approximately 14% of the larger index. |
| Hedge funds | HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index, which is designed to be representative of the overall composition of the hedge fund universe. It comprises all eligible hedge fund strategies; including but not limited to convertible arbitrage, distressed securities, equity hedge, equity market neutral, event driven, macro, merger arbitrage and relative value arbitrage. The strategies are asset-weighted based on the distribution of assets in the hedge fund industry. |
| Commodities | Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Index, which is composed of futures contracts on physical commodities traded on U.S. exchanges, with the exception of aluminum, nickel and zinc, which trade on the London Metal Exchange (LME). The major commodity sectors are represented including energy, petroleum, precious metals, industrial metals, grains, livestock, softs, agriculture and ex-energy. The Thomson Reuters / Core Commodity Index is designed to provide timely and accurate representation of a long-only, broadly diversified investment in commodities through a transparent and disciplined calculation methodology. |
| Cash | Three-month LIBOR, which is the interest rates that banks charge each other in the international inter-bank market for three-month loans (usually denominated in Eurodollars). |
| Equities | |
| Developed market large cap | MSCI World Large Cap Index, which is free-float adjusted and weighted by market capitalization. The index is designed to measure the equity market performance of the large cap stocks in 23 developed markets. Large cap is defined as stocks representing roughly 70% of each market's capitalization. |
| US | Standard & Poor's 500 Index, which is a capitalization-weighted index that includes a representative sample of 500 leading companies in leading industries of the U.S. economy. Although the S&P 500 focuses on the large cap segment of the market, with over 80% coverage of U.S. equities, it is also an ideal proxy for the total market. |
| Europe ex U.K. | MSCI Europe ex U.K. Large Cap Index, which is free-float adjusted and weighted by market capitalization. The index is designed to measure large cap stock performance in each of Europe's developed markets, except for the U.K. |
| U.K. | MSCI U.K. Large Cap Index, which is free-float adjusted and weighted by market capitalization. The index is designed to measure large cap stock performance in the U.K. |
| Japan | MSCI Japan Large Cap Index, which is free-float adjusted and weighted by market capitalization. The index is designed to measure large cap stock performance in Japan. |
| Asia Pacific ex Japan | MSCI Asia Pacific ex Japan Large Cap Index, which is free-float adjusted and weighted by market capitalization. The index is designed to measure the performance of large cap stocks in Australia, Hong Kong, New Zealand and Singapore. |
| Developed market small and mid-cap (SMID) | MSCI World Small Cap Index, which is a capitalization-weighted index that measures small cap stock performance in 23 developed equity markets. |
| Emerging market | MSCI Emerging Markets Index, which is free-float adjusted and weighted by market capitalization. The index is designed to measure equity market performance of 22 emerging markets. |
| Bonds | |
| Developed sovereign | Citi World Government Bond Index (WGBI), which consists of the major global investment grade government bond markets and is composed of sovereign debt, denominated in the domestic currency. To join the WGBI, the market must satisfy size, credit and barriers-to-entry requirements. In order to ensure that the WGBI remains an investment grade benchmark, a minimum credit quality of BBB—/Baa3 by either S&P or Moody's is imposed. The index is rebalanced monthly. |
| Emerging sovereign | Citi Emerging Market Sovereign Bond Index (ESBI), which includes Brady bonds and U.S. dollar -denominated emerging market sovereign debt issued in the global, Yankee and Eurodollar markets, excluding loans. It is composed of debt in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America. We classify an emerging market as a sovereign with a maximum foreign debt rating of BBB+/Baa1 by S&P or Moody's. Defaulted issues are excluded. |
| Supranationals | Citi World Broad Investment Grade Index (WBIG)—Government Related, which is a subsector of the WBIG. The index includes fixed rate investment grade agency, supranational and regional government debt, denominated in the domestic currency. The index is rebalanced monthly. |
| Corporate investment grade | Citi World Broad Investment Grade Index (WBIG)—Corporate, which is a subsector of the WBIG. The index includes fixed rate global investment grade corporate debt within the finance, industrial and utility sectors, denominated in the domestic currency. The index is rebalanced monthly. |
| Corporate high yield | Barclays Global High Yield Corporate Index. Provides a broad-based measure of the global high yield fixed income markets. It is also a component of the Multiverse Index and the Global Aggregate Index. |
| Securitized | Citi World Broad Investment Grade Index (WBIG)—Securitized, which is a subsector of the WBIG. The index includes global investment grade collateralized debt denominated in the domestic currency, including mortgage -backed securities, covered bonds (Pfandbriefe) and asset-backed securities. The index is rebalanced monthly. |



Disclosures

In any instance where distribution of this communication ("Communication") is subject to the rules of the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"), this communication constitutes an invitation to consider entering into a derivatives transaction under US CFTC Regulations §§ 1.71 and 23.605, where applicable, but is not a binding offer to buy/sell any financial instrument.

This Communication is prepared by Citi Private Bank ("CPB"), a business of Citigroup, Inc. ("Citigroup"), which provides its clients access to a broad array of products and services available through Citigroup, its bank and non-bank affiliates worldwide (collectively, "Citi"). Not all products and services are provided by all affiliates, or are available at all locations.

CPB personnel are not research analysts, and the information in this Communication is not intended to constitute "research", as that term is defined by applicable regulations. Unless otherwise indicated, any reference to a research report or research recommendation is not intended to represent the whole report and is not in itself considered a recommendation or research report.

This Communication is provided for information and discussion purposes only, at the recipient's request. The recipient should notify CPB immediately should it at any time wish to cease being provided with such information. Unless otherwise indicated, (i) it does not constitute an offer or recommendation to purchase or sell any security, financial instrument or other product or service, or to attract any funding or deposits, and (ii) it does not constitute a solicitation if it is not subject to the rules of the CFTC (but see discussion above regarding communication subject to CFTC rules) and (iii) it is not intended as an official confirmation of any transaction.

Unless otherwise expressly indicated, this Communication does not take into account the investment objectives, risk profile or financial situation of any particular person and as such, investments mentioned in this document may not be suitable for all investors. Citi is not acting as an investment or other advisor, fiduciary or agent. The information contained herein is not intended to be an exhaustive discussion of the strategies or concepts mentioned herein or tax or legal advice. Recipients of this Communication should obtain advice based on their own individual circumstances from their own tax, financial, legal and other advisors about the risks and merits of any transaction before making an investment decision, and only make such decisions on the basis of their own objectives, experience, risk profile and resources.

The information contained in this Communication is based on generally available information and, although obtained from sources believed by Citi to be reliable, its accuracy and completeness cannot be assured, and such information may be incomplete or condensed. Any assumptions or information contained in this Communication constitute a judgment only as of the date of this document or on any specified dates and is subject to change without notice. Insofar as this Communication may contain historical and forward looking information, past performance is neither a guarantee nor an indication of future results, and future results may not meet expectations due to a variety of economic, market and other factors. Further, any projections of potential risk or return are illustrative and should not be taken as limitations of the maximum possible loss or gain. Any prices, values or estimates provided in this Communication (other than those that are identified as being historical) are indicative only, may change without notice and do not represent firm quotes as to either price or size, nor reflect the value Citi may assign a security in its inventory. Forward looking information does not indicate a level at which Citi is prepared to do a trade and may not account for all relevant assumptions and future conditions. Actual conditions may vary substantially from estimates which could have a negative impact on the value of an instrument

Views, opinions and estimates expressed herein may differ from the opinions expressed by other Citi businesses or affiliates, and are not intended to be a forecast of future events, a guarantee of future results, or investment advice, and are subject to change without notice based on market and other conditions. Citi is under no duty to update this document and accepts no liability for any loss (whether direct, indirect or consequential) that may arise from any use of the information contained in or derived from this Communication.

Investments in financial instruments or other products carry significant risk, including the possible loss of the principal amount invested. Financial instruments or other products denominated in a foreign currency are subject to exchange rate fluctuations, which may have an adverse effect on the price or value of an investment in such products. This Communication does not purport to identify all risks or material considerations which may be associated with entering into any transaction

Structured products can be highly illiquid and are not suitable for all investors. Additional information can be found in the disclosure documents of the issuer for each respective structured product described herein. Investing in structured products is intended only for experienced and sophisticated investors who are willing and able to bear the high economic risks of such an investment. Investors should carefully review and consider potential risks before investing.

OTC derivative transactions involve risk and are not suitable for all investors. Investment products are not insured, carry no bank or government guarantee and may lose value. Before entering into these transactions, you should: (i) ensure that you have obtained and considered relevant information from independent reliable sources concerning the financial, economic and political conditions of the relevant markets; (ii) determine that you have the necessary knowledge, sophistication and experience in financial, business and investment matters to be able to evaluate the risks involved, and that you are financially able to bear such risks; and (iii) determine, having considered the foregoing points, that capital markets transactions are suitable and appropriate for your financial, tax, business and investment objectives.

This material may mention options regulated by the US Securities and Exchange Commission. Before buying or selling options you should obtain and review the current version of the Options Clearing Corporation booklet, Characteristics and Risks of Standardized Options. A copy of the booklet can be obtained upon request from Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 390 Greenwich Street, 3rd Floor, New York, NY 10013 or by clicking the following links,

http://www.theocc.com/components/docs/riskstoc.pdf or

http://www.theocc.com/components/docs/about/publications/november_2012_supplement.pdf.

If you buy options, the maximum loss is the premium. If you sell put options, the risk is the entire notional below the strike. If you sell call options, the risk is unlimited. The actual profit or loss from any trade will depend on the price at which the trades are executed. The prices used herein are historical and may not be available when you order is entered. Commissions and other transaction costs are not considered in these examples. Option trades in general and these trades in particular may not be appropriate for every investor. Unless noted otherwise, the source of all graphs and tables in this report is Citi. Because of the importance of tax considerations to all option transactions, the investor considering options should consult with his/her tax advisor as to how their tax situation is affected by the outcome of contemplated options transactions.

None of the financial instruments or other products mentioned in this Communication (unless expressly stated otherwise) is (i) insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other governmental authority, or (ii) deposits or other obligations of, or guaranteed by, Citi or any other insured depository institution.



Global Strategy: Quadrant | November 18, 2016

Citi often acts as an issuer of financial instruments and other products, acts as a market maker and trades as principal in many different financial instruments and other products, and can be expected to perform or seek to perform investment banking and other services for the issuer of such financial instruments or other products. The author of this Communication may have discussed the information contained therein with others within or outside Citi, and the author and/or such other Citi personnel may have already acted on the basis of this information (including by trading for Citi's proprietary accounts or communicating the information contained herein to other customers of Citi). Citi's personnel (including those with whom the author may have consulted in the preparation of this communication), and other customers of Citi may be long or short the financial instruments or other products referred to in this Communication, may have acquired such positions at prices and market conditions that are no longer available, and may have interests different from or adverse to your interests.

IRS Circular 230 Disclosure: Citi and its employees are not in the business of providing, and do not provide, tax or legal advice to any taxpayer outside Citi. Any statement in this Communication regarding tax matters is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used or relied upon, by any taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding tax penalties. Any such taxpayer should seek advice based on the taxpayer's particular circumstances from an independent tax advisor.

Neither Citi nor any of its affiliates can accept responsibility for the tax treatment of any investment product, whether or not the investment is purchased by a trust or company administered by an affiliate of Citi. Citi assumes that, before making any commitment to invest, the investor and (where applicable, its beneficial owners) have taken whatever tax, legal or other advice the investor/beneficial owners consider necessary and have arranged to account for any tax lawfully due on the income or gains arising from any investment product provided by Citi.

This Communication is for the sole and exclusive use of the intended recipients, and may contain information proprietary to Citi which may not be reproduced or circulated in whole or in part without Citi's prior consent. The manner of circulation and distribution may be restricted by law or regulation in certain countries. Persons who come into possession of this document are required to inform themselves of, and to observe such restrictions. Citi accepts no liability whatsoever for the actions of third parties in this respect. Any unauthorized use, duplication, or disclosure of this document is prohibited by law and may result in prosecution.

Other businesses within Citigroup Inc. and affiliates of Citigroup Inc. may give advice, make recommendations, and take action in the interest of their clients, or for their own accounts, that may differ from the views expressed in this document. All expressions of opinion are current as of the date of this document and are subject to change without notice. Citigroup Inc. is not obligated to provide updates or changes to the information contained in this document.

The expressions of opinion are not intended to be a forecast of future events or a guarantee of future results. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Real results may vary.

Although information in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, Citigroup Inc. and its affiliates do not guarantee its accuracy or completeness and accept no liability for any direct or consequential losses arising from its use. Throughout this publication where charts indicate that a third party (parties) is the source, please note that the attributed may refer to the raw data received from such parties. No part of this document may be copied, photocopied or duplicated in any form or by any means, or distributed to any person that is not an employee, officer, director, or authorized agent of the recipient without Citigroup Inc.'s prior written consent.

Citigroup Inc. may act as principal for its own account or as agent for another person in connection with transactions placed by Citigroup Inc. for its clients involving securities that are the subject of this document or future editions of the Quadrant and Quadrant Asia.

Bonds are affected by a number of risks, including fluctuations in interest rates, credit risk and prepayment risk. In general, as prevailing interest rates rise, fixed income securities prices will fall. Bonds face credit risk if a decline in an issuer's credit rating, or creditworthiness, causes a bond's price to decline. High yield bonds are subject to additional risks such as increased risk of default and greater volatility because of the lower credit quality of the issues. Finally, bonds can be subject to prepayment risk. When interest rates fall, an issuer may choose to borrow money at a lower interest rate, while paying off its previously issued bonds. As a consequence, underlying bonds will lose the interest payments from the investment and will be forced to reinvest in a market where prevailing interest rates are lower than when the initial investment was made.

Mortgage-backed securities ("MBS"), which include collateralized mortgage obligations ("CMOs"), also referred to as real estate mortgage investment conduits ("REMICs"), may not be suitable for all investors. There is the possibility of early return of principal due to mortgage prepayments, which can reduce expected yield and result in reinvestment risk. Conversely, return of principal may be slower than initial prepayment speed assumptions, extending the average life of the security up to its listed maturity date (also referred to as extension risk).

Additionally, the underlying collateral supporting non-Agency MBS may default on principal and interest payments. In certain cases, this could cause the income stream of the security to decline and result in loss of principal. Further, an insufficient level of credit support may result in a downgrade of a mortgage bond's credit rating and lead to a higher probability of principal loss and increased price volatility. Investments in subordinated MBS involve greater credit risk of default than the senior classes of the same issue. Default risk may be pronounced in cases where the MBS security is secured by, or evidencing an interest in, a relatively small or less diverse pool of underlying mortgage loans.

MBS are also sensitive to interest rate changes which can negatively impact the market value of the security. During times of heightened volatility, MBS can experience greater levels of illiquidity and larger price movements. Price volatility may also occur from other factors including, but not limited to, prepayments, future prepayment expectations, credit concerns, underlying collateral performance and technical changes in the market.

Alternative investments referenced in this report are speculative and entail significant risks that can include losses due to leveraging or other speculative investment practices, lack of liquidity, volatility of returns, restrictions on transferring interests in the fund, potential lack of diversification, absence of information regarding valuations and pricing, complex tax structures and delays in tax reporting, less regulation and higher fees than mutual funds and advisor risk. Asset allocation does not assure a profit or protect against a loss in declining financial markets. The indexes are unmanaged. An investor cannot invest directly in an index. They are shown for illustrative purposes only and do not represent the performance of any specific investment. Index returns do not include any expenses, fees or sales charges, which would lower performance. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

International investing entails greater risk, as well as greater potential rewards compared to US investing. These risks include political and economic uncertainties of foreign countries as well as the risk of currency fluctuations. These risks are magnified in countries with emerging markets, since these countries may have relatively unstable governments and less established markets and economics.

Investing in smaller companies involves greater risks not associated with investing in more established companies, such as business risk, significant stock price fluctuations and illiquidity. Factors affecting commodities generally, index components composed of futures contracts on nickel or copper, which are industrial metals, may be subject to a number of additional factors specific to industrial metals that might cause price volatility. These include changes in the level of industrial activity using industrial metals (including the availability of substitutes such as manmade or synthetic substitutes); disruptions in the supply chain, from mining to storage to smelting or refining; adjustments to inventory; variations in production costs, including storage, labor and energy costs; costs associated with regulatory compliance, including environmental regulations; and changes in industrial, government and consumer demand, both in individual consuming nations and internationally. Index components concentrated in futures contracts on agricultural products, including grains, may be subject to a number of additional factors specific to agricultural products that might cause price volatility. These include weather conditions, including floods, drought and freezing conditions; changes in government policies; planting decisions; and changes in demand for agricultural products, both with end users and as inputs into various industries.



Global Strategy: Quadrant | November 18, 2016

The information contained herein is not intended to be an exhaustive discussion of the strategies or concepts mentioned herein or tax or legal advice. Readers interested in the strategies or concepts should consult their tax, legal, or other advisors, as appropriate. Citi Private Bank is a business of Citigroup Inc. ("Citigroup"), which provides its clients access to a broad array of products and services available through bank and non-bank affiliates of Citigroup. Not all products and services are provided by all affiliates or are available at all locations. In the US, brokerage products and services are provided by Citigroup Global Markets Inc. ("CGMI"), member SIPC. Accounts carried by Pershing LLC, member FINRA, NYSE, SIPC. CGMI and Citibank, N.A are affiliated companies under the common control of Citigroup. Outside the US, brokerage products and services are provided by other Citigroup affiliates. Investment Management services (including portfolio management) are available through CGMI, Citibank, N.A. and other affiliated advisory businesses.

In Hong Kong, this document is issued by CPB operating through Citibank, N.A., Hong Kong branch, which is regulated by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Any questions in connection with the contents in this document should be directed to registered or licensed representatives of the aforementioned entity. In Singapore, this document is issued by CPB operating through Citibank, N.A., Singapore branch, which is regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. Any questions in connection with the contents in this document should be directed to registered or licensed representatives of the aforementioned entity.

In the United Kingdom, Citibank N.A., London Branch (registered branch number BR001018), Citigroup Centre, Canada Square, Canary Wharf, London, E14 5LB, is authorised and regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (USA) and authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority. Subject to regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority and limited regulation by the Prudential Regulation Authority. Details about the extent of our regulation by the Prudential Regulation Authority are available from us on request. The contact number for Citibank N.A., London Branch is +44 (0)20 7508 8000.

Citibank Europe plc is regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland. It is authorised by the Central Bank of Ireland and by the Prudential Regulation Authority. It is subject to supervision by the Central Bank of Ireland, and subject to limited regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. Details about the extent of our authorisation and regulation by the Prudential Regulation Authority, and regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority are available from us on request. Citibank Europe plc, UK Branch is registered as a branch in the register of companies for England and Wales with registered branch number BR017844. Its registered address is Citigroup Centre, Canada Square, Canary Wharf, London E14 5LB. VAT No.: GB 429 6256 29.

Citibank Europe plc is registered in Ireland with number 132781, with its registered office at 1 North Wall Quay, Dublin 1. Citibank Europe plc is regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland. Ultimately owned by Citigroup Inc., New York, USA.

In Jersey, this document is communicated by Citibank N.A., Jersey Branch which has its registered address at PO Box 104, 38 Esplanade, St Helier, Jersey JE4 8QB. Citibank N.A., Jersey Branch is regulated by the Jersey Financial Services Commission. Citibank N.A. Jersey Branch is a participant in the Jersey Bank Depositors Compensation Scheme. The Scheme offers protection for eligible deposits of up to £50,000. The maximum total amount of compensation is capped at £100,000,000 in any 5 year period. Full details of the Scheme and banking groups covered are available on the States of Jersey website www.gov.je/dcs, or on request.

In Canada, Citi Private Bank is a division of Citibank Canada, a Schedule II Canadian chartered bank. Certain investment products are made available through Citibank Canada Investment Funds Limited ("CCIFL"), a wholly owned subsidiary of Citibank Canada. Investment Products are subject to investment risk, including possible loss of principal amount invested. Investment Products are not insured by the CDIC, FDIC or depository insurance regime of any jurisdiction and are not guaranteed by Citigroup or any affiliate thereof.

CCIFL is not currently a member, and does not intend to become a member of the Mutual Fund Dealers Association of Canada ("MFDA"); consequently, clients of CCIFL will not have available to them investor protection benefits that would otherwise derive from membership of CCIFL in the MFDA, including coverage under any investor protection plan for clients of members of the MFDA.

This document is for information purposes only and does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any securities to any person in any jurisdiction. The information set out herein may be subject to updating, completion, revision, verification and amendment and such information may change materially.

Citigroup, its affiliates and any of the officers, directors, employees, representatives or agents shall not be held liable for any direct, indirect, incidental, special, or consequential damages, including loss of profits, arising out of the use of information contained herein, including through errors whether caused by negligence or otherwise

© Copyright 2016, Citigroup Inc. Citi, Citi and Arc Design and other marks used herein are service marks of Citigroup Inc. or its affiliates, used and registered throughout the world.





| Europe & Middle East | Latin America | North America | |
|--|---|---|--|
| CHANNEL ISLANDS | BRAZIL | UNITED STATES | |
| St. Helier, Jersey 44–1534–608–010 | Rio de Janeiro 55–21–4009–8905 | Beverly Hills, CA 213–239–1927 | Orange County, CA 650–329–7060 |
| ### 1534—608—010 ### 1534—608 | | 213–239–1927 Boca Raton, FL 561–368–6945 Boston, MA 617–330–8944 Chicago, IL 312–384–1450 Dallas, TX 214–880–7200 Denver, CO 303–296–5800 Greenville, DE 302–298–3720 Greenwich, CT 800–279–7158 Houston, TX 832–667–0500 Los Angeles, CA 213–239–1927 Miami, FL 866–869–8464 New York, NY 212–559–9470 Asia 212–559–9155 Latin America | |
| UNITED KINGDOM London | | 212 000 0100 | Vancouver 604-739-6222 |
| | CHANNEL ISLANDS St. Helier, Jersey 44–1534–608–010 ISRAEL Tel Aviv 972–3–684–2522 MONACO Monte Carlo 377–9797–5010 SPAIN Madrid 34–91–538–4400 SWITZERLAND Geneva 41–58–750–5000 Zurich 41–58–750–5000 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES Abu Dhabi 971–2–494–3200 Dubai 971–4–604–4644 UNITED KINGDOM | CHANNEL ISLANDS BRAZIL St. Helier, Jersey 44–1534–608–010 Rio de Janeiro 55–21–4009–8905 Sao Paulo 55–21–4009–8905 Sao Paulo 55–11–4009–5848 ISRAEL Tel Aviv 972–3–684–2522 LATAM OFFICES IN US Houston, TX 713–966–5102 Miami, FL 305–347–1800 New York, NY 212–559–9155 MAdrid 34–91–538–4400 MEXICO Mexico City 52–55–22–26–8310 Monterrey 52–81–1226–9401 SWITZERLAND Geneva 41–58–750–5000 MEXICO Monterrey 52–81–1226–9401 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES Abu Dhabi 971–2–494–3200 Dubai 971–4–604–4644 UNITED KINGDOM London | CHANNEL ISLANDS BRAZIL UNITED STATES St. Helier, Jersey 44–1534–608–010 Rio de Janeiro 55–21–4009–8905 213–239–1927 Sao Paulo Boca Raton, FL 561–368–6945 Boston, MA 561–368–6945 Boston, MA 617–330–8944 Chicago, IL 312–384–1450 Dallas, TX 713–966–5102 312–384–1450 Dallas, TX 713–966–5102 312–384–1450 Dallas, TX 214–880–7200 New York, NY 212–559–9155 Solution of Greenville, DE 302–298–3720 Greenwille, DE 302–298–3720 Greenwille, DE 302–298–3720 Greenwille, DE 302–298–3720 Dallas Solution of Greenville, DE 302–298–3720 Dubai 971–2–494–3200 Dubai 971–2–4604–4644 MEXICO Mexico City Solution of Greenville, DE 302–298–9470 Asia 212–559–9155 Dalai 212–559–9155 Dalai 212–559–9155 Dubai 971–4–604–4644 MEXICO Mexico City Solution of Greenville, DE 302–298–3720 Greenwich, CT 800–279–7158 Houston, TX 832–667–0500 Los Angeles, CA 213–239–1927 Miami, FL 866–869–8464 New York, NY 212–559–9470 Asia 212–559–9470 Asia 212–559–9155 Latin America 212–559–9155 UNITED KINGDOM London UNITED KINGDOM London UNITED KINGDOM London |